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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [SOCI](#) [AU](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: UK CONSULTANTS ON DDR: MISTRUST AND INADEQUATE CAPACITY
THREATEN DDR IMPLEMENTATION

REFS: A) KHARTOUM 1296
B) KHARTOUM 1071
C) KHARTOUM 987
D) KHARTOUM 927
E) KHARTOUM 517

11. (SBU) Summary: Over the past two weeks, a team of UK-funded consultants assessed UN, GNU, and GoSS capacity to carry out a mammoth disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program planned to commence in January 2009. They found that while the GoS has sufficient capacity to start the multi-year, multi-million dollar program in northern Sudan, the GoSS' DDR team needs additional training in order to carry out the program in the south. Furthermore, the UN lacks sufficient experienced DDR staff. The consultants expressed concern that there is a glaring lack of trust between the northern and southern DDR commissions. They also are concerned that because both the 2009 elections/2011 referendum and 2009/2012 DDR programs draw upon the same limited UNMIS resources that there might be insufficient resources to do both. End summary.

12. (SBU) UK consultants Ted Morse and Mulugeta Gebrehiwot interviewed GNU, GOSS and UN DDR officials over the past two weeks to independently assess the capacity of these organizations to carry out the planned DDR activities scheduled to start January 2009. The consultants briefed poloff on August 24 on their preliminary findings and said that they intend to use the findings for additional discussion with the GNU, GOSS and the UN. The primary question they focused on is whether the various organizations have sufficient capacity to start the four-year USD 410 million DDR program for 180,000 combatants on January 1, 2009.

THE NORTHERN COMMISSION ON DDR

13. (SBU) The Northern Commission on DDR (NCDDR) has sufficient capacity to begin the program in January, the consultants said. Morse and Gebrehiwot claimed that NCDDR senior management is experienced, highly educated and well trained. They observed that the NCDDR includes SAF military personnel, which, according to the UK-funded team, is an advantage in planning and executing DDR. However, while the Khartoum-based NCDDR top echelon leadership is strong, the NCDDR's state-level teams are understaffed and lack management talent.

THE SOUTHERN COMMISSION ON DDR

14. (SBU) According to Morse and Gebrehiwot, the Southern Commission on DDR (SCDDR) lacks sufficient capacity to conduct DDR programs, but if provided with a robust training program now, the SCDDR could be ready by January. Overall, the SCDDR needs additional trained and experienced staff at all levels who are able to conduct the broad range of DDR program planning and execution (capacity is a major

problem plaguing the GOSS across the board). Plagued by turnover, the SCDDR would benefit from the recruitment of top-level professional technical managers who are experienced in planning and operating large programs.

THE UN DDR PROGRAM

15. (SBU) The UN DDR program, which is split into DPKO-operated programs and UNDP programs, does not have sufficient capacity on the UNDP side to plan DDR programs, but can develop them if sufficient qualified staff are recruited and trained, claimed the UK-funded team. While UN leadership is capable, UN efforts are undermined by lack of sufficient staff and a high turnover rate. The UN has said it will recruit a sufficient number of staff by January, but new staff, even if technically competent, will need local area training. Morse and Gebrehiwot pointed out that the UN must recruit experienced financial staff to establish a financial system for the anticipated large number of transactions associated with the hiring of 1,000 caseworkers, multi-million dollar contracts with an estimated 200 NGOs, and payments to 52,000 beneficiaries.

OBSTACLES IDENTIFIED

16. (SBU) The consultants observed that, not surprisingly, a degree of tension and mistrust exists arisen between the SCDDR and the NCDDR. The Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC), a key organizing body with a mandate to develop clear roles, responsibilities and procedures for the commissions, has not met in three years. According to the Morse and Gebrehiwot, the lack of a neutral technical coordinating body has made the SCDDR skeptical that the Khartoum-based NCDDR dominates the planning process and marginalizes the Juba-based SCDDR.

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17. (SBU) The consultants said that while DPKO has adequate funding for the disarmament and demobilization aspects of DDR, UNDP does not have sufficient funding for its part of the re-integration programs. UNDP and DPKO appear to have planned their programs separately from each other. Furthermore, the two DDR commissions and the UN (both DPKO and UNDP) are forcing top-down planning in local offices without regard for local needs. The result is a classic case of bad planning: the UN has imported thousands of office trailers for local DDR offices, but state-level DDR offices have not yet secured land for the trailers.

THE WAY FORWARD

18. (SBU) Based on their preliminary findings, the UK-funded team will recommend that there should be a tripartite north-south-UN DDR workshop on the planning process to deal with tangible deficiencies. The consultants suggested that developing a trusting north-south relationship is important and that any relationship-building program should include the TCC, whose participation is critical. With regards to level of trust between the northern and southern DDR commissions, the consultants said that "if you want someone to agree with you on the execution, they need to be there for the planning."

19. (SBU) The UK-funded team suggested that additional local level commitment would further the goals of both northern and southern DDR programs. They suggested that veteran groups be more involved and that localities aggressively take part in planning DDR programs. "The variation of local needs are too great for top-down planning to work effectively," said one consultant who gave the example that some southern states have 100,000 soldiers who want to do farming, while other states might have only 200 farmers. "Besides, more local planning would go a long way to reduce southern mistrust."

POSSIBLE CHALLENGE: SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS AND DDR

10. (SBU) The consultants said that the multi-year 2009-2012 DDR program and the anticipated 2009 elections and 2011 referendum follow parallel timelines. They expressed concern that given existing shortfalls in capacity, the near simultaneous resource requirements will exceed UNMIS limited capacity to support both DDR and the elections and referendum programs at the same time.

Comment

11. (SBU) Concerns linked to Sudan's DDR program include not only the classic north-south reluctance to commit to the implementation of the program, but are compounded by the South's lack of capacity to carry out the program effectively and the UN's lack of preparedness and inter-agency coordination to manage the program appropriately. The UK-funded team's assessment has highlighted only a few of the daunting obstacles facing the start of this massive, costly effort. In order to address some of the logistical and capacity issues that exist, enhanced donor support is needed, which in the wake of the June 25 DDR donor appeal (ref C) conference, has not yet materialized. This team's latest report will likely be used for another appeal for donor DDR support.

FERNANDEZ